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_______________________________________________________________ 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the use of the Markov Regime Switching Model 
(MRSM) as a means to track changes in the levels of investor confidence. It also 
assesses the probabilities of a country switching between different regimes using the 
transition probability matrix. A maximum of three possible levels or regimes of risk – 
low, intermediate and high volatility regimes, is considered. From the smoothed 
probabilities calculated for different regimes, this paper makes inferences about 
timings of debt crisis. Comparing Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines and Indonesia in 
particular, we date the onset and subsequent dissolution of crisis-induced panic. We 
give interpretations of the results based on evidences of debt crisis. The objective is to 
investigate if there is information in the transition probability matrix and smoothed 
probabilities that country risk managers can use to make assessment on risk condition.  
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Modeling Country Risks: An Asian Perspective 
1. Introduction 
A country defaults on its loan when it is unable and/or unwilling to pay its 
obligations on interest and principal of its debt on time. Such an event can seriously 
impair banks’ balance sheets and profitability. In a highly volatile business 
environment, it is therefore important that banks have the necessary resource and 
tools to assess the risk of default. One of the main responsibilities of country risk 
managers is to do country visits, partly to establish networking contacts and to access 
news on the ground. The process of making country risk assessment based on country 
visits alone however, can be subjective, so banks also rely on some forms of 
quantitative approach, or a systematic framework, to analyze country risk and 
improve their portfolio performance. 
The rule-based reasoning spreadsheet model is one common method that 
commercial banks used to monitor historical and future outlook of the country’s 
economic prospects, politics and social environment.  The model gives a score to each 
indicator according to the criteria / rules set by the managers.3 The scores are added 
up for different criteria and countries with low (high) risk of default will have high 
(low) scores. One advantage of the rule-based model is that it allows users to modify 
the model to meet their specific requirements. If particular risk factors have greater 
bearing on business or investments, composite risk ratings can be recalculated by 
giving greater weight to those factors. Because of the ease in use and design, the rule-
based models have been widely adopted in commercial banks and risk rating agencies.  
                                                 
3 For example, in assessing a current account deficit, the rule can be set that if a country has a current 
account deficit of say 3% of GDP in a particular year, that’s in the safety zone, so a higher country 
score is assigned to the indicator in that year.  If a country has a current account deficit of 5% of GDP, 
that’s a reason for concern, so an average country score is assigned.  If a country has a current account 
deficit of 8% of GDP that’s cause for alarm, so a lower country score is assigned. Weights that summed 
up to 100% are attached to sub-categories of risk, for example political, financial and economic. 
 3
There is however a limitation with using the rule-based approach to model the 
country’s risk of default. The model requires the managers to input changes in the 
economics, politics and social situation in a timely manner. Sometimes investors can 
change their expectations of economics, political and social fundamentals so quickly 
enough that they affect the whole economic landscape. And what make the job 
challenging for the managers is that that it is not easy to track these changes without a 
formal framework. Based on our experience, this point emphasizes the importance of 
having statistical models to track changes in the levels of investor confidence.  
This study investigates the Markov Regime Switching Model (MRSM) as a 
means to track changes in the levels of investor confidence. A maximum of three 
possible levels or regimes of risk – low, intermediate and high volatility regimes, is 
considered. From the smoothed probabilities calculated for different regimes, this 
paper makes inferences of when ‘panic’ starts and when ‘panic’ ends. 4 We give 
interpretations of the results based on evidences of debt crisis. Using the transition 
probability matrix, this paper assesses the probabilities of a country switching 
between different regimes, and based on cross country comparison, the analysis 
makes inferences about the risk of investing in the country. The objective of the paper 
is to investigate if there is information in the transition probability matrix and 
smoothed probabilities that country risk managers can use to make assessment on risk.  
The study will be on countries in Asia and Latin America, namely Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Brazil and Mexico in part because we wanted some basis of 
comparisons across international countries. These countries were used as case studies 
because both countries have large foreign debts that are predominantly owed by the 
government. Moreover, a large share of their public debts are denominated in, or 
                                                 
4 Monthly data is used for the first experiment. Daily data is used for the second experiment. 
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linked to, the dollar, which makes the countries sensitive to movements to 
depreciation in the local currencies respectively. In the case of Philippines, 
accumulated public sector debt is estimated at 130% of GDP, of which two-thirds is 
government debt (half in foreign currency), and the rest that of state-owned quasi-
commercial entities. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews factors 
that had contributed to debt crisis over the last three decades in some emerging 
countries. Section 3 reviews previous work on country risk modeling Section 4 
describes the data and the econometric methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical 
results (the working paper currently focuses on Philippines and Brazil). Section 6 
concludes by explaining how the results from using the MRSM methodology to 
capture volatility in a country’s exchange rate can help industry practitioners such as 
country risk managers make better assessment on country risk. It also provides 
suggestions for future work.  
 
2. International Debt Crisis in Emerging Economies 
Two observations can be made when analyzing debt crisis in emerging 
countries over the last three decades. One, when debt crisis occurred they do not strike 
only one country in isolation, but a few emerging countries that are either 
geographically close to, or apart from, each other. These experiences suggest either 
the influence of contagion or the influence of common external factors on debt crisis.  
We look at the effects of external influence, as seen from changes in oil price 
and related to this, monetary policy in the US. Periods of strong US dollar policy or 
rapid changes in oil prices have coincided with several international debt crises. For 
example during the periods of strong US dollar policy in the 1980’s, the Eastern 
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Europe and Latin American countries experienced debt crisis. Likewise a strong US 
dollar policy between 1994 and 1998, coincided with a series of crisis that sparked the 
crisis in Latin America in 1994, followed by the Asian Financial crisis in 1997 and the 
crisis in Russia and Latin America in 1998.  
Indeed rapid changes in price of oil are seen as catalyst for capital flows. For 
example, following the rapid increase in oil prices in the 1970’s oil exporting 
countries in the Middle East deposited billions of dollars in profits they received from 
the oil commodities sold, in to US and European banks. These commercial banks 
were eager to make profitable loans to governments and state-owned entities (as well 
as private companies) in developing countries, using the dollars flowing from the 
Middle Eastern countries. And developing countries, particularly in Latin America, in 
turn were also eager to borrow relatively cheap money from the banks. The catalyst 
that triggered huge inflows into funds into emerging countries in the 1970s was 
caused by rapid rise in oil prices. In contrast, the period of low global oil prices as 
experienced by developed economies on the one hand, and the period of strong 
economic growth in emerging economies had caused differentials in interest rates 
between developed and developing economies. This in turn led to a new cycle of 
funds to flow from the developed economies to the emerging markets, as seen prior to 
the 1994 crisis in Latin America and prior to the 1997 crisis in Asia. Again, the fall in 
oil prices prior to the 1998 crisis in Russia and Brazil led to deterioration in the terms 
of trade for these oil-exporting countries, which meant debt repayment problems for 
these countries.  
A second observation is that emerging markets had defaulted on their external 
debts repeatedly, over different periods in time, which suggest the influence of local 
or idiosyncratic factor that had made debtor countries susceptible to default not once 
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or twice, but many times over. In total over the past two centuries Turkey has 
defaulted six times, Brazil seven times, Mexico eight times, Venezuela nine and 
Argentina five. These countries tend to have weak fiscal structures and weak financial 
systems. These countries tend to rely too much on foreign debt for their growth, after 
liberalization policies which had encouraged borrowing by the public or private 
sectors. When the global or local environment became no longer conducive to hold 
foreign debt, the debtor countries became susceptible to defaults. These countries 
have heavily relied on commodity exports as a major source of foreign earnings. 
Experiences have shown that debtor countries faced problems repaying their debts 
when commodity price fall.  
Inconsistency in economic policies is another negative driver for defaults; this 
happens when the government became overly committed to keep the exchange rate 
pegged at a certain level, while experiencing uncontrollably large flows of foreign 
funds and keeping inflation and growth under check. To illustrate, when there is a 
large inflow of funds, the central bank’s has to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market to prevent the exchange rate from appreciating. In which case, if it is an un-
sterilized intervention, interest rates will fall and that itself will cause the central bank 
to worry about economy becoming overheated.5 In contrast, when there is a large 
outflow of capital, the central bank has to intervene to keep the peg exchange rate 
from depreciating which makes interest rates increase; this will cause the central bank 
to worry about the economy going into a recession. From the experiences of countries 
such as Mexico in 1994, Asia in 1997, and Brazil in 1999 which went through 
financial crisis, central bank intervention to prevent the local currencies from 
                                                 
5 If the intervention to buy foreign reserves is sterilized, that means the central bank has neutralized (or 
cancel out) the effect of intervention on money supply.  For example, if the government increases 
reserves by buying foreign currency the domestic money supply will increase, but  it can cancel out the 
effect on money supply by selling securities such as treasury bills to mop up the supply. 
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appreciating had been shown to lead to serious overheating problems (as seen in large 
current account deficits, high rate of inflation). When speculators speculated that the 
peg is no longer feasible in the light of unsustainable growth, they pulled the funds 
out which resulted in sharp correction in the economy. One lesson to be learnt is that 
it is important to trace the effects of exchange-market interventions and changes in 
foreign-exchange reserves on national monetary bases and other monetary aggregates 
relative to their counterparts in the target country or countries. A long buildup of 
foreign-exchange reserves should be taken as a danger signal, rather than as a sign of 
strength, for governments and central banks trying to manage exchange rates. Our 
discussion points to the weakness of soft pegs, especially for countries that are 
integrating into international capital markets. Debtor countries become subjected to 
perils of financial policy in US when they choose a peg exchange rate system. The 
impossible trinity, that a country cannot simultaneously maintain a fixed exchange 
rate, capital mobility and a monetary policy dedicated to domestic goals, clearly 
applies here. A country is better off exiting the soft peg when the currency is strong, 
as happens when reforms gain credibility and capital flows in.6  
In sum, these idiosyncratic factors are specific (or, local) to each country. 
Generally speaking, the more unfavorable the idiosyncratic factor, the more adversely 
a country would react to shifts in external factors.7 
 
3. Country Risk Literature 
Some of the comprehensive surveys on country risk models can be found in 
earlier papers such as by Saini and Bates (1984) which focused on survey of the 
                                                 
6 This happened in the case of Poland and Israel, where in each case the band widened as pressure for 
the currency appreciated. 
7 See Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1997) and Verma and Soydemir (2006) for investigations on 
influence of local and global risk factors on country risk 
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quantitative approaches of published empirical papers. Eaton and Taylor (1986) 
reviewed the theoretical aspects of numerous papers relating to least developed 
countries LDC debt and financial crisis, with an emphasis on the policy implications 
to be drawn. Rockerbie (1993) explained the interest spread on sovereign Eurodollar 
loans on the basis of various indicators on default risk in lesser developed countries 
and developed countries. He also provided a useful summary of risk indicators in the 
empirical papers examined.  
A more recent survey by Hoti and McAleer’s (2004) found more than half of 
the models used in empirical studies were probability-based models with the most 
popular model being the logit model, followed by the probit, discriminant and Tobit 
models. Their survey found the most frequently used dependent variable was the 
probability of debt rescheduling, followed by agency country risk ratings.8 In these 
studies, three types of explanatory variables were used, namely economic, financial 
and political indicators, with economic and financial risks being the major 
components of country risk.9 For economic and financial risks, they are represented 
by country’s economic performance, terms of trade, exchange rates, monetary 
reserves, rapid increases in production costs and / or energy prices and unproductively 
invested foreign funds. Political risk, is seen to emerge from events such as wars, 
internal and external conflicts, territory disputes, revolution changes of government 
and terrorist attacks.  
                                                 
8 Agency country risk ratings are used as measures of country creditworthiness and hence serve as 
indicators of the probability of debt rescheduling.. The lower is a country’s creditworthiness, the higher 
is the associated risk in investing in the country, and the higher is the probability that the country will 
reschedule its future debt payments. Some agencies such as Institutional Investor, Euromoney and 
ICRG provide quantitative country risk ratings which range from o (lowest) to 100 (highest 
creditworthiness), while Rundt & Associates ratings are rated on a scale of 1 (best) to 10 (worst). Other 
agencies such as Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and EIU publish qualitative letter ratings. For example, 
country risk ratings for Moody’s range  from Aaa (highest) to C (lowest).  
 
9 In practice, these three groups are regarded as interdependent because businesses and individuals 
monitor the economic and financial consequences of political decisions. 
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4. Methodology: Regime-Switching Regressions 
The methodology that we use to model regime-switches in mean follows 
Hamilton (1989) while that used to model regime-switches in volatility can be traced 
to Hamilton and Susmel (1994). The reader is referred to these key references for full 
details. Here, in order to motivate our argument that transition probabilities can be 
used to characterize the idiosyncratic risks of a country, we merely outline the key 
role played by the Markov chain in modeling regimes. 
Structural break refers to sudden change in the behavior of a time series data. 
To incorporate the potential recurrence of such breaks into forecasts, nonlinear 
models such as Hamilton’s (1989) regime-switching approach are often adopted. This 
allows the change in regime to be modeled as a random event that could potentially 
recur, and for which the probability of recurrence could be forecasted. Thus, the 
change in regime is itself a random variable, whose probability law is defined within 
the data generating process. Equivalently, the regime or state is modeled as a discrete 
process. 
In this paper, we assume the unobserved regime can be modeled by a Markov 
chain, the simplest time series model for a discrete-valued random variable. We 
consider a maximum of three possible regimes. Let st be a random variable that can 
assume only integer values {1, 2, 3}, where the probability that st equals some 
particular value j depends on the past only through the most recent value st-1 
 ijttttt pisjsPksisjsP ======= −−− }|{},,|{ 121 Κ . (1) 
Such a process is described as an N-state Markov chain with transition probabilities 
given as Njiijp ,...,2,1,}{ = . The transition probability pij gives the probability that state i 
will be followed by state j, so that pi1 + pi2 + pi3  = 1. 
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 In a 3-state regime for example, the transition probabilities can be represented 
in a (3 × 3) matrix P known as the transition matrix, where the element in row j, 
column i is the transition probability pij: 
 
11 21 31
12 22 32
13 23 33
p p p
p p p
p p p
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
P  (2) 
 Let the regime that a given process is in at date t be indexed by an unobserved 
random variable ts , where there are N possible regimes (st = 1,2,.....N). When the 
process is in regime 1, the observed variable yt is presumed to have been drawn from 
a 21 1( , )N μ σ  distribution. If the process is in regime 2, then yt is drawn from a 
2
2 2( , )N μ σ  distribution, and so on. Hence, the density of yt  conditional on the random 
variable st taking on the value j is 
 f(yt| st = j; θ) = 12πσjexp⎩⎨
⎧
⎭⎬
⎫−(yt − μj)2
2σ2j  (3) 
for j = 1, 2, …, or N. For an N regime case, θ is a vector of population parameters that 
includes μ1, …, μN and σ21, …, σ2N. 
 The unobserved regime {st} is presumed to have been generated by some 
probability distribution, for which the unconditional probability that st takes on the 
value j is denoted πj, where P{st = j; θ} = πj for j = 1, 2, …, or N. The probabilities 
π1, …, πN are also included in θ; so that θ = (μ1, …, μN, σ21, …, σ2N, π1, …, πN)'. The 
joint density-distribution function of yt and st is given by 
 p(yt, st = j; θ) = πj2πσj exp⎩⎨
⎧
⎭⎬
⎫−(yt − μj)2
2σ2j . (4) 
 Summing (4) over all possible values for j then gives the unconditional density 
for yt: 
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1
( ; ) ( , ; )
N
t t t
j
f y p y s j
=
= =∑θ θ  (5) 
 
Since the regime st is unobserved, expression (5) is the relevant density describing the 
actual observed data yt. If the regime variable st is distributed i.i.d. across different 
dates t, then the log likelihood for the observed data can be calculated from (5) as 
 L(θ) = ∑
j = 1
T
log f(yt; θ) (6) 
The maximum likelihood estimate of θ is obtained by maximizing (6) subject to the 
constraints that π1 + π2 + … + πN = 1 and 0jπ ≥  for j = 1, 2, …, N. 
 Functions of the form of (5) can be used to represent a broad class of different 
densities. The joint density-distribution p(yt, st = 1; θ) is π1 times a N(μ1,σ21) density, 
while p(yt, st = 2; θ) is π2 times a N(μ2,σ22) density. The unconditional density for the 
observed variable f(yt; θ) is the sum of these two magnitudes. 
 Once one has obtained estimates of θ, it is possible to make an inference about 
which regime was more likely to have been responsible for producing the date t 
observation of yt. Again, from the definition of a conditional probability, it follows 
that 
 P{st = j |yt; θ} = p(yt, st = j; θ) f(yt; θ)  = 
πj·f(yt|st = j; θ)
f(yt; θ)  (7) 
Given knowledge of the population parameters q, it would be possible to use (3) and 
(5) to calculate the magnitude in (7) for each observation yt  in the sample. This 
number represents the probability, given the observed data, that the unobserved 
regime responsible for observation t was regime j.  
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 The mixture density (5) has the property that a global maximum of the log 
likelihood (6) does not exist. A singularity arises whenever one of the distributions is 
imputed to have a mean exactly equal to one of the observations (μ1 = y1, say) with no 
variance (σ21 → 0). At such a point the log likelihood becomes infinite. 
 Such singularities do not pose a major problem in practice, since numerical 
maximization procedures typically converge to a reasonable local maximum rather 
than a singularity. The largest local maximum with sj > 0 for all j is described as the 
maximum likelihood estimate. 
 Hamilton and Susmel (1994) suggested an extension to the above model 
which would allow for changes in regimes to affect the residual variance through 
 
tt s t
u g u= × % (8) 
Here, t t tu h v= ⋅%  is said to follow an ARCH-L(q) process, in a reference to the 
“leverage” effect proposed by Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1989), when tv  is 
white noise and th  is given by (see Hamilton and Susmel’s equation (3.4)) 
 2 2 2 2 20 1 1 2 2 1 1t t t q t q t th u u u d uα α α α ξ− − − − −= + + + + + ⋅ ⋅% % % %L  (9) 
with 1 1td − =  = 1 for 1 0tu − ≤%  and 1 0td − =  otherwise. 
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5. Empirical results 
Brazil is an interesting case study of how its debt problem had evolved and 
what the government had done to overcome the problem. A significant portion of its 
foreign borrowing in the 1970’s had been by state enterprises to import sophisticated 
equipments. They had borrowed to finance their investments, as part of the nation’s 
import-substitution industrialization strategy to reduce dependency on imported oil, 
raw materials and production goods. By 1980 the foreign-debt problem grew to 
US$72 billion, prompting the government reduce economic growth and with it, the 
country’s imports, so that trade surpluses could grow to service the country’s foreign 
debt. The economy contracted further when its access to international financial 
markets was cut off after Mexico announced a moratorium on its debt service 
payments in August 1982. Growth on average slowed to 2.2% during the period 
1980- 1989, down from 8.6% during the period 1970 – 1979.  
Chart : Total global debt (private and public) 
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Source: IMF  
Brazil defaulted on its debt payment on April 1994. Earlier in the 1990’s, 
external debt ballooned with private capital representing the most important source of 
financing current account deficits, which have risen as a natural consequence of the 
attractiveness of investments and the sluggishness with which domestic savings have 
 14
recovered. At the end of 1993, Brazil's external debt totaled approximately $146 
billion. Of this total, about $34 billion is medium-term commercial bank debt owed 
by the government. In 1994, Brazil's net public debt as a share of gross domestic 
product was 30 per cent, and by 2002 it has soared to 60%. In April 1994, the 
government concluded a debt renegotiation agreement with foreign commercial banks, 
where it restructured $35 billion in defaulted bank loans.10 Unlike past Brady Plan 
debt exchanges, the Brazilian deal was closed without the support of the official 
international financial community since the Brazilian government was unable to reach 
an agreement with the IMF for a standby program. According to the data of the Banco 
Central do Brasil, Brazil’s gross external debt was $210.8 billion in 2001. Brazil did 
not reach an agreement with the Paris Club during 1994 to reschedule official debt.  
Under Brazil's 1992 agreement with the Paris Club, further debt rescheduling is 
contingent upon the government concluding a standby agreement with the IMF. Two 
months after Brazil defaulted on its debt payment on April 1994, the currency was 
changed on June 1st 1994, the old "cruzeiro real" was abandoned and the new 
currency, Real (symbol R$) was set equivalent to R$1=US$1. Leading to the default 
period, the currency had been depreciating. Of interest to us in the paper is whether 
the MRSM model recognizes those periods as state of high exchange rate volatility?  
To answer this question (and similarly for other periods of default in 
Philippines) we chose the exchange rate as dependant variable in the MRSM. The 2-
state and 3-state Markov switching models in mean and ARCH are used on rate of 
change of the exchange rates for Brazil and the Philippines. Tables 1 and 2 tabulate 
the estimated parameters of the model for regime switch in mean and ARCH process, 
                                                 
10 Early in the1990s, foreign capital began to return but it took a rather different form from the capital 
inflows of the 1970s. They were smaller and were no longer dominated by loans from international 
banks. Instead, foreign lenders sought equity investments in Brazilian enterprises. Foreign firms with 
the capacity to manage direct investments in Brazil began to replace commercial banks as the primary 
source of foreign capital. 
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respectively, over the period Jan 1991 to 2006 for Brazil exchange rates. We will 
focus on Figure 1 which shows what the smoothed probabilities look like, as 
computed using the 2-state MRSM in mean, as well as, Table 3 which shows the 
transition probability matrix for a 2-state MRSM in ARCH. 
Table 1 
Brazil exchange rates: 2- and 3-state Markov regime-switching in mean 
 
For vector of coefficients parameterized as follows  
Parameters 2-State 3-State 
φ01 (state 1) 0.81669708 (0.68065066) 25.407313  (7.9507125) 
φ02 (state 2) 28.526341 (1.2050712) 1.9681327  (7.6964441) 
φ03 (state 3)  -8.8397458  (7.9150066) 
φ1 0.23088258   (0.076706789) 0.25468823  (0.081042334) 
φ2 0.64493820   (0.072919056) 0.70417325  (0.095716954) 
φ3 -0.37784452  (0.074037527) -0.066189749  (0.086040506) 
φ4 -0.11834924  (0.076772947) 0.042887599  (0.092629168) 
2σ  24.158351 (2.7276962) 30.376019 (3.4748320) 
11p  0.97038181   (0.014680544) 0.25298719  (0.31248720) 
22p  0.88279609   (0.053850995)  
21p   0.027060649  (0.015163082) 
23p   0.19338502  (0.10529877) 
Log-likelihood -366.74456 -380.79013 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. φ0i  i=1,2 are means for each state, 
4,3,2,1, =iiφ  are autoregressive coefficients, 2σ  is disturbance variance and ijp  are 
transition probabilities. Except first one, all the other estimates are highly significant.  
 
 16
Table 2 
Brazil exchange rates: 2- and 3-state Markov regime-switching ARCH 
 
For vector of coefficients parameterized as follows  
 
 2-State 3-State 
Parameters Est Coef Std error Est Coef Std error
Constant term in regression 0.001398 0.014319 -0.00068 0.01508
φ1 -0.39822 0.080697 -0.32743 0.046198
φ2 -0.27808 0.049048 -0.23135 0.037022
φ3 -0.22216 0.046189 -0.11317 0.031486
φ4 -0.03816 0.045491 -0.04986 0.020324
Constant term in ARCH -0.00591 0.006477 -0.0044 0.003512
α1 1.136291 0.656693 0.964997 0.305492
α2 -0.19417 0.181628 0.138237 0.126326
α3 -0.4253 0.294132 0.280295 0.140642
α4 -0.45642 0.317642 0.270232 0.131912
 7.751217 3.038459 6.594891 1.976034
 -1.73242 0.705339 419.7382 864.4072
 -1.14E-06 0.066235
 419.3038 865.7632
variance factors for state 2 216.0973 250.6664 373.849 306.0998
variance factors for state 3 84.10411 65.02843
df for t distribution 1.078659 1.054343 3.142789 2.53236
Log-likelihood -329.65141 -325.72967
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. For the 2-state model, the transition probabilities are expressed in terms of 1 2,θ θ  as follows 
2 2
11 1 1(1 )p θ θ= + , 2 222 2 2(1 )p θ θ= +  
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Figure 1 shows what the smoothed probabilities look like, as computed using the 
2-state (high volatility state vs low volatility state) MRS in mean. Using the monthly data, 
the chart shows that the model captured two periods of large changes in the value of the 
exchange rate value (one in July 1994, Jan 1999 and Mar 1999), as state of high volatility, 
where the model showed the volatility lasted for three months (July to Sep 94) and (Jan 
to Mar 99). During the July 1994 period, the real appreciated by more than 30%. During 
the Jan 1999 period, the real depreciated by about 22%, and this was followed by a 30% 
appreciation in Mar 1999. In other periods there were also exchange rate volatilities but 
they are of more moderate magnitude, and the model did not trigger any state of panic. In 
each case, the results suggest that financial volatility lasted for three months before 
financial calm was restored again. We will explain these empirical results based on 
evidences in Brazil.  
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Figure 1  
Brazil Exchange Rate: 2-State Smoothed Probabilities 
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April 94 – country defaulted on foreign-dollar loan 
June 94 - Real Plan, replaced the cruzeiro with the Real 
Nov 94 – central bank gave up the monetary anchor and allowed the 
exchange rate to revalue 
Jan 99 – spillover from AFC in 
1997 and Russia crisis in 1998, 
exchange rate band widened 
Mar 95 – Feb 99: exchange rate based on band 
In early 2002, pressure on Real resume – 
concerns that Brazil was not able to pay 
its external debt 
Feb 99 onwards: exchange rate became 
determined by market forces 
From mid 98. Brazil faced continued attack on its 
exchange rate regime, which led to depletion of 
international reserves. The attack intensified after 
re-election of Cardoso in Nov 98, culminating in 
abandonment of semi-fixed exchange rate and 
adoption of managed floating regime in Jan-99.  
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In 1990, a floating exchange rate regime has been adopted, but two months after 
the country default on its loan in April 1994, it implemented a Real plan in June 1994 to 
make the currency a controlled currency. With this plan, the old "cruzeiro real" was 
abandoned and the new currency, Real (symbol R$) was set equivalent to R$1=US$1 on 
June 1st 1994. Despite it being a controlled currency, the real currency managed to gain 
value against the dollar (as sharp as 30% in July 1994) for the following reasons: the 
Central Bank had increased interest rates and there was liquidity in the international 
markets; most important of all, foreigner investors believed in the success of the Plan 
Real, which would (with the fall of inflation) cause redistribution of income, and Brazil 
saw a massive influx of foreigner investments. The MRSM triggered the period of 
appreciation of the Real during the period July to September 1994 as a state of high 
volatility. Indeed, inflation declined dramatically in the first two months of the plan. 
Brazil had the longest period of low inflation in its history; in several months, indexes 
were negative. 
Chart 2: Dollar vs Real 
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Source: IMF 
Pressures then started to come from politicians that Real had appreciated too 
much over the last 12 months, causing concerns that the country had been losing export 
competitiveness. From Mar 1995 to Feb 1999, a new exchange rate based on bands was 
introduced. During the period, the dollar would be adjusted downwards about 0.6-0.7% 
per month (7-8% per year), a process of gradual depreciations of the Real. From mid-
1998 Brazil started facing continued attack on its exchange rate regime, which led to 
sustained depletion of its international reserves. The attack intensified after re-election of 
Cardoso in Nov 98, culminating in abandonment of semi-fixed exchange rate and 
adoption of managed floating regime in Jan-99. 
In the year 1999, Brazil was involved in a currency crisis, as a result from the 
1997 Asian crisis and the 1998 Russian crisis. The crisis led to several occasions of 
speculative attacks against the Real, during which time the central bank would react by 
selling dollars at official rate and increase interest rates, to punish those who did not 
believe in the Real. In 13 Jan 1999 the exchange rate band was widened to R$1.20 – 
R$1.32 per US$1. There was record capital outflows $14 bn within a few days. The 
interest rates were again raised, but that did not stop the attacks. The Central Bank had to 
sell tens of billions of dollars at official rate. At that time, the Government decided that 
the protection of the Real with high interest rates was too expensive at the expense of 
halting the economy, and that the Real should float freely. The exchange rate devalued 
by more than 20%. Our model captured the events in January 1999 as a high volatility 
state that lasted for three months before financial calm was restored again. By Feb 1999, 
the exchange rate became determined by market forces. The currency has been set into 
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an independently floating regime since 1999, with inflation targeting framework set as a 
guide for monetary policy. This explains why from 1999 onwards the Real has become 
more erratic versus the dollar.  
There were subsequently some more exchange rate volatilities. In 2001 when 
public debt reached 70% of GDP, there were concerns that the country will not repay 
foreign public debt and this had caused sovereign bond spreads to widen to 2000 basis 
points by October 2002. There were periods of depreciation (about 10% in some months), 
but it was not significant enough for the MRSM to capture that event as a state of high 
volatility. Then in Nov 2002 the exchange rate made an about turn and appreciated by 
about 20%, which coincided with a major rescue package announcement by the IMF, 
coupled with an unexpectedly prudent economic policy by the new administration in 
Brazil. Both probably succeeded in resolving most doubts and could explain the 
confidence in the currency. The chart in Figure 1above showed that the 20% appreciation 
was not significant enough for the MRSM to capture that event as a state of high 
volatility 
Table 3 shows the transition probability matrix for a 2-state MRS in ARCH.  
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Table 3 
Transition Probability Matrix – Brazil exchange rates (Feb 1992 – Oct 2004) : 
SWARCH 2 State 
 Low High 
Low 0.983628 0.24992 
High 0.016372 0.75008 
 
The transition probability matrix in a 2-state model is interpreted as follows. First, there 
is a high 98% probability that a low volatility state will be followed by a similar state. 
There is a high 75% probability that a high volatility state will be followed by a similar 
state. Second, there is a higher probability that the state will switch from high to low 
volatility than for the reverse to occur (25% versus 1.6%). Both results suggest that that 
there is a greater tendency for the country to both stay in low volatility (than stay in high 
volatility) and revert to low volatility (than to revert to high volatility). 
 
We relaxed the model and increase the number of states from a 2-state to 3-state. Figure 
2 shows what the smoothed probabilities look like using the 3-state (high, moderate vs. 
low state) MRS in mean. The results look similar in terms of model’s ability to define 
periods of exchange movements in Jul 1994 and Jan 1999 as highly volatile. One 
difference in the results is that the 3-state model additionally defined the periods Mar 
1995 and May 1995 as at state of highly volatile exchange rate. Evidences showed that 
on 6th Mar 1995, a new exchange rate system based on bands was introduced. The band 
was set at R$0.86-R$0.98 per U.S. Dollar, wider from the previous band of 0.844 to 
0.846. There were subsequent revisions that saw upward increase in both the min-max of 
the band (i.e. depreciation of Real) but it was not sufficient for the 3-state or 2-state 
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model to trigger panic state. Interestingly, the 3-state model also did not capture the 
exchange rate movements in first half of 1992 as intermediate state of volatility.  
Likewise, the model also did not capture for most of periods between years 2001 to 2003 
the exchange rate movements as intermediate state of volatility.  
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Figure 2: 
Brazil Exchange Rate: 3-State Smoothed Probabilities 
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Table 4 shows the transition probability matrix for a 3-state MRS in ARCH.  
Table 4 
Transition Probability Matrix – Brazil Exchange Rate (Feb 1992 – Oct 2004)  
SWARCH 3-State 
 
 Low High Intermediate 
Low 0.978 0 0.501 
High 0.022 0 0.499 
Intermediate 0 1 0 
 
The interpretation of the results using a 3 state model is more interesting. Looking at the 
first column, the matrix says that there is a high 98% probability that a calm state can be 
followed by a similar state, and the remaining probability that a calm state can be 
followed by a high volatility state is low at 2%. According to the second column, the 
matrix says that there is a no chance that a high volatility state would be followed by 
either a high volatility state or a calm state. Instead, the estimates show that a high 
volatility state will always be followed by an intermediate state. Lastly, according to the 
third column, there is about an even chance that an intermediate state will move to either 
of the calm or high volatility states, and no chance that it will move to its own state. In 
this regard, the interpretation of the transition probability matrix of our experiment with a 
3-state model is actually a lot more interesting and the information content is richer than 
what we saw with a 2-state model.  
 
Philippines Results 
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The 2-state and 3-state Markov switching models in mean and ARCH are used on 
rate of change of the exchange rates for the Philippines, and selected results are tabulated. 
Table 5 tabulates the estimated parameters of the model for regime switch in ARCH 
process, over the period Jan 1991 to 2006 for the Philippines exchange rates. For the 
purpose of the paper, we will focus on Figure 3 which shows what the smoothed 
probabilities look like, as computed using the 2-state MRS in ARCH and Table 6 which 
shows the transition probability matrix for a 2-state MRS in mean. 
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Table 5: 
Philippines exchange rate returns: 2- and 3-state Markov regime-switching ARCH 
 
For vector of coefficients parameterized as follows  
 2-State 3-State 
Parameters Est Coef Std error Est Coef Std error
Constant term in 
regression 0.003446 0.007269 0.08165 0.026836
φ1 0.296109 0.031702 0.469773 0.044223
φ2 -0.06184 0.00917  
Constant term in 
ARCH -0.00075 0.000671 -0.02785 0.013973
α1 0.464372 0.124378 0.357229 0.116594
α2 0.409497 0.135976 0.221127 0.095581
α3 0.165019 0.082286 0.212757 0.09574
α4 0.452975 0.126977 0.650853 0.233105
α5 1.14E-11 0.076169  
α6 0.285865 0.085091  
 5.309918 0.898346 6.588735 1.375089
 1.368861 0.296751 3533.987 3421.994
 -1.90712 0.467351
 -2730.65 2657.393
variance factors for 
state 2 321.8117 109.5413 84.01945 29.02991
variance factors for 
state 3 1569.728 714.4381
 0.20821 0.446185  
df for t distribution  
Log-likelihood -521.193 
 
Figure 3 and 4 show what the smoothed probabilities look like, as computed 
using the 2-state MRS (high volatility state vs low volatility state) and 3-state MRS in 
ARCH. Using the monthly data, the charts show periods of high appreciation and 
depreciation in the peso. As a result of the volatilities in the exchange rate, the 2-state 
model captured several periods as being in state of high volatility (Jan-80, April-80, Nov-
84, June-84, Nov-84 to Feb-85, Jan-96, July-87, Jun-90 to Jan-91, Jul-97 to Jan-98). We 
will for analysis purpose study two periods of high volatility as given by the 2-state 
model, first during 1984 to 1985 and second during 1990 to 1991, both of which coincide 
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with periods of debt re-negotiations by the Philippines government. The 3-state model 
gives a more refined interpretation of the volatility with inclusion of the intermediate 
state, but makes the exercise more tedious hence we shall focus for clarity on the results 
of the 2-state model.  
First, during 1984 to 1985 the peso depreciated by around 25%, which the MRS 
model captured as states of high volatility. The Philippines had turned to the IMF 
previously in 1962 and 1970 when it had run into balance of payments difficulties. It did 
so again in late 1982. An agreement was reached in February 1983 for an emergency 
loan, followed by other loans from the World Bank and transnational commercial banks. 
On October 17, 1983, it was announced that the Philippines was unable to meet debt-
service obligations on its foreign-currency debt of US$24.4 billion and was asking for a 
ninety-day moratorium on its payments. Leading to the Oct 83 period, the exchange rate 
had showed some signs of volatility, and accordingly the 2-state MRS model registered 
state of panic in Dec 83 which lasted for one month. Calm set in for four months. The 
cycle repeats with the model registering another round of state of panic that similarly 
lasted for one month, followed by state of calm for one month and another cycle of state 
of panic for subsequent four months (Oct 84-Feb 85).  
Subsequent requests were made for moratorium extensions. In each of these 
arrangements with the IMF, the Philippines agreed to certain conditions to obtain 
additional funding, generally including devaluation of the peso, liberalization of import 
restraints, and tightening of domestic credit (limiting the growth of the money supply and 
raising interest rates). The adjustment measures demanded by the IMF in the December 
1984 agreement were harsh, and the economy reacted severely. Because of its financial 
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straits, however, the government saw no option but to comply. Balance of payments 
targets were met for the following year, and the current account turned positive in FY 
1986, the first time in more than a decade. But there was a cost; interest rates rose to as 
high as 40 percent, and real GNP declined 11 percent over 1984 and 1985. The dire 
economic situation contributed to Aquino's victory in the February 1986 presidential 
election. 
Our second example refer to the period between June-90 to Jan-91, when the peso 
depreciated by around 5-10% per month, and the model during this period showed states 
of high volatility. In fact leading to the month February 1991, the Philippine government 
also said that it would ask the Paris Club for deferment of payment on US$1 billion in 
debts falling due from June 30, 1991 to July 31, 1992. In March 1991, Philippine 
officials raised the issue of "condonation," or debt forgiveness, of Philippine debt with 
United States officials, requesting that the United States accord the Philippines similar 
treatment to that accorded Egypt and Poland. The United States resisted the entreaty, 
pointing out that whereas US$33 billion of Poland's US$48 billion debt was official, all 
but 20 percent of the Philippine debt was owed to commercial banks.  
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Figure 3: 
 Philippines exchange rate returns: 2- state Markov regime-switching ARCH 
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Figure 4: 
 Philippines exchange rate returns: 3-state Markov regime-switching ARCH 
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Table 6 shows the transition probability matrix for a 2-state MRS in ARCH for 
Philippines exchange rate.   
Table 6: 
Transition Probability Matrix – Philippines (Jan 1977 – Feb 2007)  
SWARCH 2 State 
 
 Calm Panic 
Calm 0.965748 0.347974 
Panic 0.034252 0.652026 
 
The transition probability matrix in a 2-state model is interpreted as follows. 
There is a high 97% probability that a calm state will be followed by a calm state. There 
is a moderately high 65% probability that a panic state will stay in a  panic state. There is 
a higher probability that the state will switch from panic to calm than for the reverse to 
occur (35% versus 3%). In this regard, the interpretation of the transition probability 
matrix of our experiment with a 2-state model is interesting because it suggests that there 
is a greater tendency for the country to stay in calm (than stay in panic) and for the 
country to revert to calm (than to revert to panic) 
We relaxed the model and increase the number of states from a 2-state to 3-state 
(high, moderate vs. low volatility states). Table 7 shows the transition probability matrix 
for a 3-state MRS in ARCH for Philippines exchange rate.   
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Table 7 
Transition Probability Matrix – Philippines (Jan 1977 – Feb 2007) 
SWARCH 3 State 
 Calm Panic Intermediate 
Calm 0.977483 0 0.62616 
Panic 0.022517 0.784348 0.37384 
Intermediate 0 0.215652 5.01E-08 
 
The interpretation of the results using a 3 state model is more interesting. 
Looking at the first column, the matrix says that there is a high 98% probability that a 
calm state can be followed by a calm state, or the remaining low 2% probability that a 
calm state can be followed by a panic state. According to the second column, the matrix 
says that there is no chance that a panic state would be followed by a panic state; 
however there is a 78% chance that the panic state would stay at panic state, or 20% 
chance that it be followed by an intermediate state. The estimates suggest that a panic 
state will most likely stay in panic state. According to the third column, at the 
intermediate state, there is about 63% chance it will move to calm state and remaining 
36% chance of staying in intermediate state. In this regard, the interpretation of the 
transition probability matrix of our experiment with a 3-state model is actually a lot more 
interesting and the information content is richer than what we saw with a 2-state model.  
 
6. Conclusions 
From a country risk analysis perspective, we found that applying the 
methodology of MRSM model yields potentially useful information. For Brazil, which 
had intermittent periods of flexible and controlled exchange rate, the model captured the 
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transitional changes during periods of exchange rate appreciation and exchange rate 
depreciation as state of high volatility. However, during latter period of flexible exchange 
rate system, the model did not capture the volatility of the exchange rate movements as 
high, nor as intermediate volatility state (in the 3-state version of the model). In such 
instances, there were periods of depreciation (about 10% in some months), but it was not 
significant enough for the MRSM to capture that event as a state of high or even 
intermediate volatility. For Philippines, the 2-state model captured most of the peaks in 
peso depreciations as high state of volatility. For some periods, an exchange rate 
devaluation of around 5% is sufficient enough for the model to trigger these periods as a 
state of high volatility.   
We also found the use of the MRSM yields potentially useful information for 
country comparisons. We compared the results in Brazil model with the Philippines 
model. One interesting interpretation of the transition probability matrix is its use as a 
measurement of risk. If we use the transition probability matrix as a gauge of level of risk 
in investing in currency asset, we observe that during the state of panic in either country, 
Philippines peso has a higher chance of staying in panic state as compared to Brazil.  
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